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I. BACKGROUND 
 Recent trends reveal the search by companies for a legal hook to prevent the 
undesired and unauthorized copying of information posted on websites.  This quest has 
sparked a fundamental controversy over the ownership of information and the Internet 
itself.  Some believe that information published on websites should be used only in a 
manner sanctioned by the publisher, so that “businesses can proceed without fear of 
unwanted trespassers who will steal or profit from the fruits of [the business’] labor.''1  
Many argue, however, that the efficient exchange of factual information, unhampered by 
any legal or technological barrier, unquestionably benefits society and weighs strongly 
against the enforceability of any restrictive mechanism. 2       
Especially troublesome to those who struggle against this unwanted copying of 
website information are software robots, small programs that automatically and rapidly 
search, copy and retrieve information from websites.3  Prevalent and controversial among 
software robots are shopbots or pricebots, which comb through commercial websites, 
                                                 
1 See May Wong, Associated Press,  eBay, Bidder’s Edge End Lawsuit (March 2, 2001), available at 
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/h/ap/20010302/tc/ebay_settlement_1.html (quoting Jay Monahan, eBay's legal 
counsel for intellectual property) 
2 See Brief of Amici Curiae Mark A. Lemley et al. at 3-8, Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 
1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C-99-21200RMW). 
3 See Stephen T. Middlebrook & John Muller, Thoughts on Bots: The Emerging Law of Electronic Agents, 
56 BUS. LAW. 341, 342-43 (2000).  A robot is a program that navigates the World Wide Web’s hypertext 
structure, recursively retrieving documents.  Robots are also referred to as “bots,” “spiders,” and “web-
crawlers.”  Search engines illustrate a fundamental use of robots; these robots traverse the Internet, 
recursively following hyperlink after hyperlink and indexing the web pages at the end of the links.  The 
indexed web pages are then stored in the search engine’s database so that a user may later query the search 
engine to discover the indexed page.  While robots are not intrinsically harmful to the internet, as in a 
properly functioning search engine robot, a poorly implemented robot or a flood of identical robots can tax 
the Internet’s infrastructure.  See Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion, at 
http://info.webcrawler.com/mak/projects/robots/norobots.html.  Different than robots, but also relevant to 
the struggle against illegitimate copying are unauthorized deep links.  Hyperlinks are software instructions 
sent to a networked computer to retrieve data.  With websites, hyperlinks are the text and pictures, which 
when clicked, take the clicker to a different web-page.  Deep links take the user to an interior page of 
another’s website.  Therefore, if a website wishes for all its users to enter through a homepage, an 
unauthorized deep link may thwart this policy.  See Michael F. Finn and James M. Assey, Handling 
Unauthorized Deep Links: Legal Issues and Practical Strategies, 4 ACCA DOCKET  36, 38 (2000).   
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extracting pricing and product information. 4  Typically, shopbots are used in conjunction 
with a metasite, a website that displays prices from a variety of vendors for an identical 
item.5  While shopbots and metasites tend to revolve around pricing information, these 
systems have been employed to compile and exploit information ranging from the 
schedules of ticketed events to the contact information of website proprietors.6      
 Websites attempting to thwart price/information indexers may invoke 
technological methods to prevent access by robots.7  First, a website may incorporate a 
robot exclusion header, a text file that indicates that the site does not allow unauthorized 
robotic activity. 8  However, compliance with the Robot Exclusion Standard is entirely 
voluntary; a robot must be programmed to read the header and conform to its control 
directives before searching a website.9  Second, if a website detects a robot’s presence 
from repeated and rapid requests generated from a single server, the website may then 
block inquiries from that server’s Internet Protocol address.10  However, attempts to 
block queries from a specific IP address often prove unsuccessful, because robot 
information requests may be effected through proxy servers, which frustrate efforts to 
                                                 
4 Frictions in Cyberspace, THE ECONOMIST , Nov. 20, 1999, available at 
http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=346410; see also infra Part II.C.    
5 See Frictions in Cyberspace supra  note 4.  Metasites offer little original content, but rather aggregate and 
organize the content of other websites.  See infra Part II.C.   
6 See generally Ticketmaster Corp., v. Tickets.com, No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 
2000) (presenting a claim against website that placed deep hyperlinks to plaintiff’s ticketing and event 
information web-pages); Register.com v. Verio, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 5747, 2000 WL 1855145 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
8, 2000) (presenting a claim against website that used data robots to extract names, physical addresses, 
email addresses, and telephone numbers for patrons of the plaintiff). 
7 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns Product and Pricing 
Information, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965, 1984-85 (2000). 
8 See Martijn Koster, A Standard for Robot Exclusion, at 
http://info.webcrawler.com/mak/projects/robots/norobots.html.  To implement a robot exclusion header, the 
server must create a text file available on the “[local URL]/robots.txt.”  The file consists of only two 
elements: 1) the types of robots that the exclusion header is aimed at, and 2) the portion of a URL that is 
not to be visited by the robot.  This approach has generated momentum because of its ease of 
implementation and the ability of a robot to access the information with only one query.  See id.       
9 See id.  
10 See Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2000); See David Kramer 
and Jay Monahan, Panel Discussion: To Bot or Not to Bot: The Implications of Spidering, 22 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT . L.J. 241, 245-46 (2000).  Every server maintains a unique Internet Protocol (“IP”) address.  
When a server queries another server, the requesting computer must furnish its IP address so that the 
information requested may be sent.  If a server detects quickly repeated queries from a specific IP address, 
this may indicate that the server is hosting a robot.  Once robotic activity is confirmed, the requested 
computer may simply block queries from that specific IP address.     
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locate the originating IP address.11  Finally, a website might employ password technology 
to limit its contents to authorized viewers.12  However, password mechanisms currently 
fail to distinguish between human users and robots, and furthermore, this procedure may 
hinder legitimate access.13  No technological method, therefore, currently exists to 
effectively prevent robot searches of websites while maintaining the site for sanctioned 
public use.  Furthermore, the risk with any technological advancement remains, that the 
blocked robot will find a way to circumvent the new technological barrier, causing the 
searched site to become even more restrictive, in a “technological arms race.”14 
 In response to the failure of these technological barriers, websites have asserted a 
variety of legal claims to protect their posted information. 15  In particular, recent cases 
illustrate the use of the common law doctrine of trespass to chattels to block further 
searches by data robots.  Trespass to chattels occurs when one interferes with the 
possession of personal property of another, and thereby proximately causes injury. 16  In 
Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. and Register.com v. Verio, Inc., two different courts 
                                                 
11 See Ebay 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1061; Kramer & Monahan, supra note 10, at 245-46.  Proxy servers act as a 
locus for outgoing server queries and preserve system resources by centralizing outgoing and incoming 
data.  Generally, use of proxy servers is limited to local users.  Often due to inadequate maintenance, 
however, remote users may employ proxy servers.  By exploiting this feature, remote users can route 
outgoing queries through a proxy server, thereby effectively concealing their location.  A server hosting a 
robot may send its robotic queries through a proxy server and attach the proxy server’s IP address to all of 
its inquiries.  Any server detecting robotic activity will be lead to the proxy server and not to the actual 
server hosting the robot.     
12 See Kramer & Monahan, supra note 10, at 245-46. 
13 See id at 245-46; see also O’Rourke, supra note 7, at 1985.   
14 See Kramer & Monahan, supra note 10, at 247; see also O’Rourke, supra note 7, at 1985.  As those who 
try to thwart technological restriction mechanisms become more resourceful, so will  websites then add 
further layers of technological protection to block the newly learned techniques.  The addition of layer upon 
layer of technological protection influences and limits innocent website use.  See O’Rourke, supra note 7, 
at 1985.  Currently, companies exist that create and sell software with the specific purpose of evading any 
kind of defensive mechanism implemented to block data robots.  See Kramer & Monahan, supra note 10, at 
247.         
15 Several of these legal claims have generally proved to be unreliable and are beyond the scope of this 
paper.  First, while copyright law may provide a remedy for some robotic replication of website data, most 
shopbots only extract unprotected factual information.  See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, passim (1991).  Second, while the Digital Millenium Copyright Act criminalizes 
“technological measure[s] that effectively control access to a work protected by copyright,” it is unclear 
that circumventing either a Robot Exclusion Header or IP address blocking will invoke the DMCA’s 
protection.  17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(2000).  Finally, while the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act criminalizes 
the transmission of a program with reckless disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk to the recipient 
computer, those who attempt to invoke the CFAA may find it difficult to demonstrate damages (as Ebay 
illustrates) and the intent to defraud.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B) (2000). 
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found that the use of shopbots to scour websites constituted a trespass to cha ttels when 
the unauthorized robotic activity drained the plaintiffs’ system resources, thereby causing 
injury. 17  In a criticized aspect of these two cases, the courts disregarded that Bidder’s 
Edge’s and Verio’s shopbots generated a maximum of 1.53% and 2.3% of the system 
queries, respectively, and essentially aggregated the hypothetical drain on system 
resources if multiple robots combed the plaintiffs’ websites simultaneously. 18  In this 
fashion, the courts satisfied the requirement of actual injury with the possibility of future 
harm.   
 Given the precarious injury criterion of the trespass to chattels doctrine, dicta in 
both Ebay and Register.com reveal that contract law may provide a less demanding legal 
method of preventing the search of websites by data robots.  In Ebay, the court notes that 
Ebay requires consumers to accept a user agreement, which among other things, prohibits 
the use of any robot to monitor or duplicate content contained within the website.19  The 
court then suggests that while Bidder’s Edge never agreed to comply with the user 
agreement, if it had consented, the terms of the contract would have been binding. 20  In 
Register.com, the court explicitly relies upon the enforceability of a user contract to find 
that Verio breached the agreement when it employed the robotically extracted 
information in an unauthorized manner.21  Furthermore, the court indicated that while 
Register.com’s user agreement fails to prohibit the use of robots to search its website,22 a 
contract limiting the use of robots would be enforceable.23  Therefore, both Ebay and 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 Thrifty-Tel v. Bezenek, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468 (1996); see W. Page Keeton ET . AL., Prosser and Keeton on 
the Law of Torts, 85-87 (5th ed. 1984).    
17 See Register.com, 2000 WL 1855145, at *11; Ebay100 F. Supp. 2d at 1070.  
18 See Brief of Amici Curiae Mark A. Lemley et al. at 14, Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 
1058 (2000) (No. C-99-21200RMW).  The courts found that if the defendant’s use of robots were to 
proceed unchecked, such use would encourage others to engage in similar robot activity.  Instead of only 
one robot indexing Ebay’s data, the court hypothesized there may soon be several.  And once others begin 
to use similar robots to collect data from a website, system use will skyrocket, and the website will suffer 
“irreparable harm from reduced system performance, system unavailability, or data losses.”  Ebay 110 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1066.   
19 See Ebay 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060. 
20 See id. at 1060. 
21 See Register.com, 2000 WL 1855145, at *5-8. 
22 Rather, Register.com’s agreement forbids using its data to send mass unsolicited commercial advertising.  
Therefore, it is not the robot gathering of data that Register.com proscribes, but rather the use of the data 
once it has been collected.  It is this aspect of the contract that Verio breached.  See id. at *5-8. 
23 See id. at *8. 
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Register.com signify that online contracts offer a legally viable mechanism to prohibit 
shopbots from scouring websites and extracting information, regardless of how the 
information is ultimately used. 
 If blocking shopbots is as simple as posting a mandatory user agreement on a 
website, the question arises whether this end result is acceptable and desirable.  Part II of 
this paper argues that contrary to popular belief, enforceability of contracts that restrict 
shopbots (“robot restriction contracts”) will aid in achieving economic efficiency, rather 
than hindering its progress.  Part III of this paper reviews the application of common law 
contract doctrine and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”) to 
robot restriction contracts.  Both the trends in contract common law and UCITA sanction 
the enforceability of robot restriction agreements.  Part IV of this paper integrates the 
results of the economic efficiency analysis of Part II and the contract law analysis of part 
III to gauge whether public policy is served by the enforcement of robot restriction 
contracts.  This investigation indicates that the creation of a technical standard to 
accommodate fair use robotic activity is necessary to preserve public- interest pursuits.   
 
II. ROBOT RESTRICTION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
 Conventional “brick and mortar” market systems have failed to achieve economic 
efficiency and perfect competition. 24  However, features of electronic markets and the 
Internet may reduce the frictions of traditional commerce, which have heretofore 
prevented an efficient market.  Specifically, metasites potentially offer the consumer a 
costless mechanism to determine pricing and product information for any commodity 
offered for sale by any vendor.25  While many have championed metasites as the panacea 
for imperfect competition, economic modeling and empirical evidence suggest that a rash 
transition to consumer reliance on metasites may impede economic efficiency, instead of 
promoting it.26  Rather, an unhurried transition to a market controlled by metasites will 
                                                 
24 See generally infra Part II.A (discussing the elements of economic efficiency).        
25 See generally infra Part II.C (discussing reduced search costs of metasites) 
26 Economic modeling illustrates that an abrupt transition to metasites may result in either monopolistic 
pricing through vendor collusion or cyclical price wars effected through harmful mass-robot proliferation.  
See generally infra Part II.C.1.  Empirical evidence suggests that factors unrelated to search costs 
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enhance economic efficiency. 27  In other words, online retailers limiting access to their 
pricing and product information will further the transition to greater economic efficiency, 
rather than hinder it. 
A. Economic Efficiency and Perfect Competition 
 Richard Lipsey defines perfect competition as “a market structure in which all 
firms in an industry are price takers and in which there is freedom of entry into and exit 
from the industry.”28  Economic efficiency incorporates three elements.29  First, efficiency 
in distribution requires that the market distribute products among consumers so that the 
items are allocated in a manner in which no consumer would prefer a different available 
item.30  Second, efficiency in production involves the maximization of the production of 
desired goods to the extent that resource variables permit.31  Third, consumer sovereignty 
requires the production of items most desired by consumers.32  A market economy 
characterized by homogenous products, perfectly informed consumers and the absence of 
search or transaction costs will generate market prices equal to the marginal cost of 
production, thereby satisfying the three elements of economic efficiency and creating an 
environment of perfect competition. 33   
 To illustrate why prices equaling the marginal cost of production are necessary for 
an efficient economy, consider two consumers, X and Y and two products, a and b.  
Furthermore, assume X’s marginal rate to substitute a for b is 2 and Y’s marginal rate to 
                                                                                                                                                 
contribute to price dispersion.  Thus, eliminating search costs will not produce economic efficiency.  See 
generally infra Part II.C.2. 
27 A controlled transition to metasites will eliminate the dangers of mass-robot proliferation while providing 
an opportunity for price-dispersing factors unrelated to search costs to dissipate.  Only when these factors 
fade, will reduced search costs lead to economic efficiency.  See infra generally Part II.D.   
28 RICHARD G. LIPSEY ET AL., ECONOMICS 915 (8th ed. 1987); see infra note 33 (describing why economic 
efficiency and perfect competition exist in the same context). 
29 See ROBERT DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS 114 (1967). 
30 See id. at 115-16.   
31 See id. at 116-20. 
32 See id. at 120-26. 
33 Karen Clay et al., Pricing Strategies on the Web: Evidence from the Online Book Industry *6 (2000) 
(unpublished manuscript) (citing J. Bertrand, Theorie Mathematique de la Richesse Sociale, 67 JOURNAL 
DES SAVANTS 499-508 (1883)).  In the Bertrand economics model, firms produce identical products, 
consumers are perfectly informed, firms set prices and will elect to set prices at the marginal cost of 
production.  In the Bertrand model, if a firm charges a price higher than the marginal cost of production it 
will face zero demand.  Conversely, if a firm charges a price less than the cost of production, it will capture 
the whole market but will be unable to sustain itself as it generates losses.  Therefore, all firms will fall into 
equilibria, charging marginal cost of production for all items.  See id.    
 7
substitute a for b is 4.  X will then substitute 1b for 2a with indifference.  However, X 
would advantageously seek to exchange 1b for 3a.  Consequentially, Y will gain if Y can 
substitute 3a for 1b, because Y’s marginal rate of substitution of a for b is 4.  This 
situation, where a mutually advantageous opportunity for substitution exists, is not 
economically efficient.34  Rather, efficient economics requires that all consumers 
maintain the same marginal rate of substitution for all products.35  When all consumers 
purchase products at the same price, the consumers’ marginal rates of substitution 
necessarily converge.36  Thus, a consumer enjoys the greatest utility when the marginal 
rate of substitution between a pair of products equals the ratio of the products’ respective 
prices.37  
 Given that comprehensive price equality is a necessary condition for economic 
efficiency, why must that price equal the marginal cost of production for an item?38  
Economic efficiency requires efficiency in production as well as distribution. 39  As noted 
above, efficiency in production exists when the production system of all commodities is 
maximized; in other words, production is efficient when as much of product a is created 
as possible, without lessening the production of product b.40  Now, assume that 2 
                                                 
 In a perfectly competitive environment, no vendor has any control over price.  Such a vendor may 
sell as much or little of an item as it chooses at that item’s established price, but may not charge more or 
less.  Where prices equal the marginal cost of production a vendor has no choice but to sell its goods at that 
price.  If economic efficiency requires that goods be priced at their marginal cost of production, then 
economic efficiency necessarily produces perfect competition because vendors must then charge marginal 
cost of production or fail.  PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 457 (11th ed. 1980) 
 Note that economic efficiency and perfect competition will not necessarily be the most profitable 
framework for a seller.  Rather a perfect monopoly and perfect price-discrimination yield the most 
profitable result, but both of these characteristics are inherently inconsistent with economic efficiency and 
perfect competition, because here, sellers would have absolute control over prices.  See infra, Part II.C.2. 
34 See generally DORFMAN, supra note 29, at 115-16 (1967); SAMUELSON, supra note 33, at 416-19. 
35 See DORFMAN, supra  note 29, at 115.  
36 What seems like an impossibility, having equal marginal rates of substitution among consumers, 
becomes a reality with uniform pricing of items.  Consumers select quantities of different items so that their 
marginal rate of substitution between each pair of items equals the ratio of their prices, thus equating 
marginal rates of substitution between consumers.  See id.     
37 See id. at 115.  Thus efficient distribution exists when all consumers share the same marginal rate of 
substitution between all items, because then no exchange could benefit any consumer without harming 
others.  Id. 
38 Marginal cost is “the increment of Total Cost that comes from producing an increment of one unit of q.”  
It can be calculated by subtracting the total costs of adjacent outputs.  SAMUELSON, supra  note 33, at 442. 
39 See DORFMAN, supra  note 29, at 116.  
40 See id. at 116.  Efficient production requires that the value of every product be the same in every firm 
that employs it, “for then no reallocation of resources among firms could increase the total value of the 
economy’s output or could increase the output of any commodity without reducing the output of some 
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consumers exist (X & Y) , who are interested in purchasing a, which has a marginal cost of 
production of 10.  X is willing to pay up to 10 for a; Y is willing to pay up to 20 for a.  If 
the manufacturer of a prices it at any value above 10, then to maximize profits, the 
manufacturer will produce only 1a, where production efficiency necessitates the 
maximum possible output, or 2a.  Thus, economic efficiency requires that a product a be 
priced uniformly and at the marginal cost of production. 
B. Why Sellers Object to Price Indexing 
 The question arises why companies would object to shopbot price indexing of 
their products.  One might initially presume that vendors would appreciate the free 
publicity, which metasites offer.  For example, a vendor would benefit when a consumer 
who had not considered purchasing from the vendor, elects to do so based on metasite 
use.  Numerous factors, however, counteract any shopbot benefit. 
 First, if contrary to the economic modeling,41 shopbot and metasite use will 
inevitably lead to marginal cost of production prices through lower search costs, this in 
turn will cause reduced seller profits.  By preserving elevated search costs, vendors 
maintain market power, through which they will exploit price dispersion. 42  Specifically, 
sellers have an incentive to impede the flow of pricing, product, and vendor information 
when the seller occupies a dominant market position. 43  What would Amazon.com, which 
charges prices substantially higher than competitors, gain from permitting consumers to 
view an item by item, price by price and vendor service by vendor service comparison? 44  
Amazon.com would, in fact, gain little if it were revealed that it offers the same package 
of product and services for a higher price.  Conversely, reputed brand retailers may fear 
that metasites will deliver to consumers an inaccurate comparison of sellers.45  For 
                                                                                                                                                 
other.”  Id at 144; See also  supra, note 36 (explaining how uniform pricing equates marginal rates of 
substitution).    
41 See infra , Part II.C.  
42 See O’Rourke, supra  note 7, at 1978. 
43 See id. at 1978; see also J. Bradford DeLong & Michael Froomkin, Speculative Microeconomics for 
Tomorrow’s Economy , in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND 6, 25 (Brian Kahin & Hal R. Varian eds., 
2000) (couching the reluctance of established vendors to participate in price indexing as the vendors’ 
exploitation of ignorance about the availability of lower search costs). 
44 Assuming for example that a competitor offers the identical item at a lower price with the same quality of 
service and warranty.   
45 See O’Rourke, supra  note 7, at 1978. 
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example, if a metasite only displays two sellers offering the same item for the same price, 
the seller that has expended significant funds developing an exceptional customer service 
and delivery system, wastes this cost.46  
 Second, shopbot and metasite use may upset a seller’s revenue model. 47  In 
addition to sales of products, online retailers earn money through the sale of advertising 
space, as well as commissions received when they link customers to other related 
specialized websites.48  Use of metasites necessarily diverts consumer traffic away from 
the retailers’ sites, disrupting the integrity of their revenue models.  Metasite use would 
thus effectively redistribute income from the seller to the middleman, thereby causing 
increased product prices to compensate for the lack of indirect revenue.   
 Finally, sellers may fear, as expressed in the trespass to chattels cases, that 
unauthorized robot use will drain their systems’ resources.49  While current shopbot use, 
as represented in Ebay v. Bidder’s Edge, constitutes only inconsequential system use, the 
proliferation of metasite use suggests that increased robotic activity may tax sellers’ 
systems, causing unnecessary expense.50 
 Therefore, despite the positive aspects of shopbot use for established sellers, 
several additional factors indicate metasite prevalence will produce negative 
consequences on their business.   
C. Metasite Inefficiency 
  Given that products priced at their marginal cost of production is a condition for 
economic efficiency, the question arises whether the reduced search costs associated with 
shopbots and metasites will inevitably lead to lower prices, unvarying among vendors.  
Shopbots automatically request pricing and product information from multiple online 
retailers.  In response to a consumer’s query of a metasite, a shopbot can within seconds 
                                                 
46 This is the weaker of the two arguments.  As metasites progress they will offer more and more seller 
information.  Currently, metasites, in addition to price, offer product information, and seller delivery track 
record, seller warranty and return policy, and customer satisfaction.  See http://www.MySimon.Com   
47 See O’Rourke, supra , note 7, at 1982. 
48 See DeLong & Froomkin, supra  note 43, at 29-32; O’Rourke, supra note 7, at 1982. 
49 See Ebay 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1071. 
50 See id. at 1071; Supra Part II.B.1 
 10
retrieve the product and pricing information for the item selected by the consumer.51  
Thus, a shopbot performs in a matter of seconds what a human consumer would be 
unable to accomplish in hours.  Shopbots, therefore, appear to promise a substantial 
reduction in the costs of obtaining and distributing product and pricing information, a 
generally accepted economic boon, reducing market friction and enhancing economic 
efficiency. 52  While negligible search costs, generating a free flow of product and pricing 
information, are a prerequisite for prices set at the marginal cost of production, these 
frictionless searches do not by their nature alone generate economic efficiency.  Rather, 
economic modeling and empirical evidence suggest that: 1) unrestrained shopbot 
implementation may lead to either monopolistic practices or price wars, which unduly tax 
the Internet infrastructure, and 2) factors unrelated to search costs preserve price 
dispersion, frustrating any move toward economic efficiency. 
1. Economic Modeling of Unmonitored Shopbot Proliferation 
Traditional economic models commonly assume that consumer search costs are 
negligible.53  Furthermore, in a market system of homogeneous products and 
inconsequential search costs, the conventional Bertrand economics model expects that 
price competition among vendors in an efficient market will reduce prices to the marginal 
cost of production, with sellers generating zero profits.54  While such a result is 
commonly considered desirable,55 positive search costs have until now resulted in above 
marginal cost pricing.  It has therefore been theorized that the radical decline in search 
costs, resulting from shopbots and metasites, will lead to the destabilization of 
                                                 
51 Websites like www.shopper.com and www.mysimon.com collect, sort, and display pricing, product, and 
other information on items ranging from groceries to consumer electronics.51  WWW.Shopper.com claims 
to compare 1,000,000 prices of 100,000 different computer components.  For example when I entered on 
March 26, 2001 that I was searching for a VHS version of Mary Poppins (one of my favorite films), 
Mysimon.com presented me with a list of 34 results.  The list included the name of the vendor, a merchant 
review, and the price.   
52 See DeLong & Froomkin, supra note 43, at 18-35. 
53 See SAMUELSON, supra note 33, at 39. 
54 See supra  note 33; id at 39; Michael D. Smith, et al., Understanding Digital Markets: Review and 
Assessment, in UNDERSTANDING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, *4 (Erik Brynjolfsson & Brian Kahin eds. 1999), 
available at http://ecommerce.mit.edu/papers/ude. 
55 See generally JACK HIRSCHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 234 (4th ed. 1988); SAMUELSON, 
supra note 33, at 456-74 (discussing how imperfect competition harms consumerism and resource 
allocation); Yannis J. Bakos, Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Marketplaces, 43 
MGMT. SCI. 1676, passim (1997).  
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oligopolistic pricing practices and eliminate seller profit.56  However, economic modeling 
suggests that a mass destabilization will bring adverse economic consequences, resulting 
in higher prices through formation of new oligopolies or through a mass encumbrance of 
the Internet’s infrastructure. 
 To illustrate why unrestrained shopbot mechanics may result in either 
monopolistic pricing practices or substantial burdens on the Internet, consider a market 
with a product a, offered for sale by several vendors, S, to a significantly larger number 
of potential purchasers, B.57  The value of a to a particular purchaser b is vb.  Therefore, a 
consumer purchases a when the price is less than or equal to vb, thus obtaining a utility of 
vb-p, when a transaction occurs and a utility of zero otherwise.58  Further, assume that 
consumers contemplate the price of a product based on 1 of 2 different approaches: 1) the 
consumer will purchase from the first seller that offers a for a price less than or equal to 
vb, or 2) the consumer will search all vendors and select the vendor that has priced a at 
the lowest value, assuming the price is less than or equal to vb.59  Note that option 2 is 
available only with an Internet shopbot/metasite scheme and that in a traditional market, 
consumers would be forced to select option 1 or a drastically diluted form of option 2, 
thus fundamentally altering the model.  A particular seller’s profit is equal to the 
difference in price and cost multiplied by the demand for a of that seller.60  The demand 
of a particular seller becomes a probability function of two components: a) consumers of 
type 1 have a 1/S probability of selecting the specific seller s, and b) consumers of type 2 
will select a seller s, based on the probability that s offers a at a lower price than other 
                                                 
56 See id. (asserting that the rise of the electronic marketplace will fundamentally change the three primary 
functions of the marketplace: a) to match buyers and sellers, b) to facilitate the exchange of information, 
goods, and services, and c) to provide an institutional infrastructure); Robert Kuttner, The Net: A Market 
Too Perfect for Profits, BUSINESS WEEK, May 11, 1998, at 20. 
57 Jeffrey O. Kephart & Amy R. Greenwald, Shopbot Economics, *4, available at  
http://www.research.ibm.com/infoecon/paps/html/aa99_shopbot/aa99_shopbot.html (2000).  Kephart and 
Greenwald provide a thorough economic modeling of electronic marketplaces and shopbots.  
58 See id. at *4. 
59 See id. at *4.  The buyer population is composed of both type 1 and type 2 consumers with type one 
consumers initially outnumbering type 2 consumers.  The distribution of type 1 and type 2 consumers may 
be derived in multiple ways but both types will always initially exist.   
60 See id. at *4. 
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sellers,61 or, if priced at the same low value as other sellers (including at the marginal cost 
of production), then 1/(all sellers who have achieved the lower price).62             
 When all purchasers are of type 1, seller collusion effects an oligopolistic pricing 
scheme above the marginal cost of production. 63  When all purchasers are of type 2, we 
arrive at the result of the traditional economic model, where all consumers are perfectly 
informed of all vendors, resulting in a priced at the marginal cost of production. 64  
However, the shopbot/metasite scheme promises a balance between type 1 and type 2 
consumers, as a shift to shopbot use will occur gradually rather than suddenly and 
completely.  What then is the effect of this mix of consumers?  Computations based on 
the above model reveal that as expected, vendor competition will lead to decreased prices 
through shopbot stimulation of competition. 65  However, the reduction in price does not 
occur instantaneously and does not immediately achieve marginal cost.  Rather, the 
reductions will be incremental based upon consumer reaction and the pricing of other 
vendors.  The question then arises as to how vendors will adjust their prices to maximize 
profits. 
 If vendors were able to price products according to an idealistic game-theoretic 
model, then prices would decrease to marginal cost.66  Imperfect information, however, 
forces vendors to choose from the myopically optimal method, the derivative-following 
method, or a combination thereof.67  A seller adhering to the derivative-following method 
tests incremental increases and decreases in its price, continuing to adjust in the same 
                                                 
61 A “Nash Equilibrium,” is a price vector from which a group of sellers maximizes their profits and have 
no incentive to deviate.  However, the shopbot model presented of mixed consumers of type 1 and type 2 
cannot yield a pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium, which could exist if all consumers were of type 2.  At an 
equilibrium based on the shopbot model, at least one seller must offer a for p<v.  However, this is not a 
stable condition and this seller has an incentive to deviate.  Nevertheless, a mixed-strategy Nash 
Equilibrium can exist based on the shopbot model, which would lead to prices at the marginal cost of 
production if vendors could price according to a perfect game -theoretic model.  See id. at *5-9.  
62 See id. at *5.  Both elements of the demand function must also take into consideration whether a is priced 
at or below vb.   
63 See id. at *5-6 
64 See Bakos, supra note 55, at 1690; Kephart, supra note 57, at *5.  
65 See Amy R. Greenwald & Jeffrey O. Kephart, Shopbots and Pricebots, 16 INT’L JOINT CONFERENCE ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE  506 (1999); infra notes 33 & 61. 
66 See Bakos, supra note 55; Kuttner, supra note 56.  
67 See Greenwald & Kephart, supra note 65, at 510. 
 13
direction until profitability decreases, and then reversing directions.68  The myopically-
optimal seller fixes its price by using the available information about buyer 
characteristics and competitors’ prices to maximize its profits.69  Simulations reveal that 
the derivative-following model leads to oligopolistic practices70 and the myopically 
optimal model leads to cyclical price wars, with one vendor always offering the product 
at the marginal cost of production. 71   
While an inevitable combination of these two pricing methods will most likely 
lead to price reduction, vendors will increase profits with quicker price setting.72  To 
accomplish quicker price resetting, vendors will invoke robots of their own to exploit 
metasites to learn other vendors’ prices.73  However, given the vendor’s incentive to 
make these requests as frequently as possible, vendor robot use will presumably 
overshadow consumer shopbot use.  The result of increased vendor robot use will be 
increased shopbot use, as metasites respond to vendor robot requests by deploying robots 
of their own.  This situation generates two undesirable results: 1) shopbots will begin to 
charge vendors for pricing information of other vendors and vendors in return will begin 
to charge shopbots for their own pricing information, essentially reinstating search costs, 
or 2) the presence of millions of pricing robots executing millions of requests may 
overtax the Internet to a significant degree.74      
                                                 
68 See id at 510. 
69 See id. at 510.  However, this strategy does not take into account competitor pricing strategy, but 
supposes that their prices will remain unresponsively fixed.  See id at 510 . 
70 See id. at 510.  Even though derivative followers disregard seller and consumer characteristics, their 
behavior nevertheless results in a collusive state of oligopolistic pricing.  This occurs because downward 
pricing trends under this method prove to be far more fragile than upward trends.  “For example, if A’s 
price is currently above B’s but A reduces its price by an amount insufficient to undercut B, then A’s profits 
decrease, so that A raises its price in subsequent time steps.”  Id. at 510.   
71 See id. at 509-10.  Under the myopically optimal pricing scheme, regardless of the initial distribution of 
the pricing vector, a configuration soon appears where all sellers price significantly above the marginal cost 
of production.  This state sparks one seller to reduce its price by a minimal amount.  This trend of reduction 
is repeated among the sellers until it would be unprofitable for the next seller to further reduce its price and 
instead it resets its price to the original monopolistic value.  The other sellers follow the same process, 
thereby generating a cyclical price war. 
72 See id at 5l0; see generally Kephart & Greenwald, supra note 57, at *20-32. 
73 See Greenwald & Kephart, supra  note 65, at 511. 
74 See id. at 511. 
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 Therefore, economic modeling of metasites suggests a cautious approach to the 
use of shopbots and the development of a robot pricing protocol to avoid harmful price 
wars. 
2. Other Factors Causing Above Marginal Cost Prices 
Even if reduced search costs encourage market efficiency, factors unrelated to  
search costs maintain price dispersion. 75  Empirical studies illustrate that price dispersion 
in Internet markets parallels price dispersion in traditional brick and mortar systems.76  
For example, Brynjolfsson and Smith found that prices for compact discs and books 
offered for sale through online vendors exemplify Internet price dispersion: prices 
differed as much as 50% for identical products and the average price dispersion was 
29%.77  Even if one maintains that lower search costs consequentially reduce prices, other 
factors manifest in Internet markets neutralize the effect of diminished search costs and 
contribute to conspicuous price dispersion.   
 Product heterogeneity constitutes an understandable source of price dispersion.  It 
is logical that two distinct products generate two different prices.  However, assuming 
that product heterogeneity only encompasses physical characteristics of products, it fails 
to explain the significant price dispersion in Internet markets.  Many of the examined 
Internet vendors offered identical products for sale, such as the same book or same 
compact disc.78  While these products may be physically identical, product heterogeneity 
also takes into account services, which are attached to the product.79  For example, a 
favorable return policy may distinguish a book of one seller from the book of a seller 
                                                 
75 Price dispersion results when different prices exist for the same item at the same time.  As noted above, 
the traditional Bertrand economics model assumes that as search costs are eliminated, price dispersion will 
vanish.   
76 See Joseph P. Bailey, Intermediation and Electronic Markets: Aggregation and Pricing in Internet 
Commerce (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (finding high 
price dispersion and higher costs generally for books, software and CDs); Erik Brynjolfsson & Michael 
Smith, Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers 46 no. 4 MGMT 
SCIENCE passim (2000) (Finding lower prices but high dispersion for Internet vendors of books and CDs); 
Erick K. Clemons et al. , The Nature of Competition in Electronic Markets: An Empirical Investigation of 
Online Travel Agent Offerings, passim (2000) (unpublished manuscript) (finding high price dispersion for 
online airplane ticket sales).  When I performed my search for Mary Poppins, see supra  note 41, the 34 
results I received ranged in price from $11.20 to $28.47 (at Amazon.com, see infra Part II.C).  
77 Brynjolfsson & Smith, supra  note 76 at passim.  
78 See id. at 27.  
79 See Smith et al., supra  note 54, at *9. 
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with a less beneficial return policy.  Nevertheless, these primary service characteristics 
tend not to vary among online retailers or are negatively related to price.80 Therefore, 
price dispersion exists even in a market of homogeneous products. 
 Evidence suggests that consumer convenience also contributes to price dispersion 
among online vendors.81  Time-sensitive consumers may value a seller’s computer 
interface, which provides uncomplicated product location and evaluation tools.82  Sellers 
that offer these aids may then charge consumers a premium for the convenience.83  
Factors relating to convenience among online retailers include facility of search 
mechanisms, product suggestion devices,84 product reviews,85 product samples,86 and 
rapid checkout procedures.87  These convenience elements are distinct from the physical 
characteristics (or accompanying services) encompassed within the product heterogeneity 
factor.  Because these convenience tools are separate from the physical product, retailers 
should not gain a pricing advantage because a consumer could exploit the convenience 
offered by one vendor yet purchase from another.  However, high search and switching 
costs may compel a consumer to remain with the vendor that offers the convenience 
tools.  In addition to convenience tools, website design characteristics, such as 
background wallpaper, influence consumers’ perception of a product.88  Therefore, 
construction of an agreeable and efficient online purchasing forum may grant vendors a 
license to charge a premium over sellers that fail to offer competing convenience, leading 
to price dispersion unrelated to search costs.          
                                                 
80 Brynjolfsson & Smith, supra  note 76 at *29  
81 See id. at *10; DeLong & Froomkin  supra  note 43, at 26. 
82 See Alan E. Wiseman, Economic Perspective on the Internet, POLICY PAPERS *22 (Fed. Trade Comm’n 
July 31, 2000); DeLong & Froomkin, supra  note 43, at 26, 29-32. 
83 See Wiseman, supra  note 82, at *22. 
84 For example, Amazon.com employs several mechanisms to provide consumers with suggestions.  A 
consumer can enter general criteria and Amazon.com will then offer selections based on these criteria.  
Furthermore, Amazon.com will suggest products based on past purchases of a specific consumer 
85 For example, Amazon.com displays both professional and consumer critique of its products, viewable 
adjacent to the basic product information. 
86 For example, Amazon.com offers consumers audio clips from tracks of musical selections offered for 
sale. 
87 Online retailers may offer “one-click” checkout, where a consumer’s shipping and payment information 
is stored by the vendor to facilitate the administrative aspects of purchases.  See generally Smith et al., 
supra note 54, at *10. 
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 Branding and consumer-trust may also preserve price dispersion in the absence of 
search costs.  The economic model described above89 assumes that when a consumer 
exploits a metasite, he or she will then purchase from the vendor that offers the lowest 
price.  Shopbot executives, however, have revealed that metasite visitors frequently 
purchase from recognized brands, even when these vendors present a substantially higher 
price than other retailers90  In the nascent Internet market, trust and brand play an 
important role “because of the spatia l and temporal separation between buyers and sellers 
imposed by the medium.”91  Because transactions for physical goods over the Internet 
involve disjointed payment and delivery, consumers may be willing to pay a premium to 
use a vendor that the consumer can trust with credit card information and that the 
consumer can rely upon for effective delivery.  Furthermore, the general aversion to 
personal data mining associated with online retailers suggests that consumers will opt for 
a trusted brand, which they believe will safeguard their personal information. 92  Factors 
such as online communities located on the retailer’s website, links to the retailer from 
other trusted websites or portals, extensive advertising and existing brick and mortar 
brand names contribute to Internet brand recognition and the ability to charge and receive 
higher prices.93   
 Vendors may also succeed in charging higher prices when they have implemented 
loyalty programs, which effectively lock in the consumer.94  These programs offer 
consumers incentives to remain with the vendor and discourage use of a different retailer 
that may price lower.  For example, a retailer may offer the equivalent of frequent flier 
miles, where the consumer accumulates bonuses with each successive purchase.  
                                                                                                                                                 
88 See Naomi Mandel & Eric Johnson, Constructing Preferences Online: Can Web Pages Change What 
You Want? (unpublished paper), available at http://fourps.wharton.upenn.edu/~naomi/construct.htm 
(1998). 
89 See supra Part II.C.1. 
90 See O’Rourke supra note 7, at 1974.  Well branded Internet vendors such as Amazon.com and CDNow 
charge an average of 12% higher than lesser known vendors, yet are frequently selected by consumers, 
even when the consumer is aware that the item is  offered for less. See id.   
91 Smith et al., supra note 54, at *12. 
92 See generally Federal Trade Commission, FTC announces Settlement with Bankrupt Website, 
Toysmart.com, Regarding Alleged Privacy Policy Violation , (July 21, 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/toysmart2.htm (describing claims that a company misrepresented to 
consumers that their personal information would not be disclosed to third parties).   
93 See Smith et al., supra note 54, at *13. 
94 See id. at *13; DeLong & Froomkin, supra  note 43, at 29-32. 
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Additionally, online vendors may utilize collaborative filtering tools, which compare a 
consumer’s past selections with those of other consumers and generate recommendations 
based on these data.95  Given these loyalty programs, a consumer switches vendors at a 
cost equal to the value of the extras.  Furthermore, consumer lock- in may occur in the 
absence of direct loyalty programs, through the ease of use of the vendor’s interface.  A 
consumer familiar with one online retailer’s website may avoid switching to an 
unfamiliar website.  Therefore, lock- in mechanisms, both intentional and unintentional 
may contribute to price dispersion.   
 Finally, price discrimination provides another source of price dispersion unrelated 
to search costs.  Price discrimination exists when markets have been segmented between 
high and low valuation consumers, “such that the sellers can post a high price that high 
demand consumers will find attractive given their knowledge about the products in 
question.”96  To illustrate price discrimination consider a product a, with a marginal cost 
of production of 9.  Consider 10 consumers Q, all of whom are willing to pay up to 13 for 
a.  Further, consider 1 consumer R, who is willing to pay up to 60 for a.  How does the 
vendor price a?  To maximize profits, the vendor will price a at 60, sell it to R, and 
realize a profit of 51.  If the vendor were able to sell a for 13 to Q but at 60 to R, the 
vendor would realize a profit of (10*4)+(1*51)=91.  Thus, retailers may achieve greater 
income through price discrimination. 
 Two characteristics of the Internet make price discrimination more practicable 
than in brick and mortar markets.  First, through the Internet, vendors may easily track 
consumer characteristics.97  Second, lower menu costs allow vendors to change prices 
with greater ease.98  An example illustrates price discrimination on the Internet. 
Books.com offered consumers a price matching policy.  It presented customers with a 
mechanism that compared its price for a specific item with the prices of several other 
vendors, and changed its price if another vendor offered the same item for a lower 
                                                 
95 See DeLong & Froomkin, supra  note 43, at 32-35. 
96 Wiseman, supra  note 82, at *22. 
97 See id. at *22 (citing Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
(R. Schmalensee & R. D. Willig eds., 1989) (noting that a necessary condition for price discrimination to 
occur is the ability to sort customers)). 
98  See id. at 23; see also Greenwald & Kephart, supra note 65, at 511. 
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price.99  While initially this strategy appears to provide economic efficiency, it in fact 
price discriminates.  Books.com failed to maintain the new price for future transactions.  
Thus, a consumer who elected not to engage in the price comparing process risked 
missing the pricing benefit, but avoided a potentially lengthy price comparison procedure 
and possible fruitless result.100  While price discrimination obviates economic efficiency, 
as it necessarily leads to different marginal rates of substitution, it may offer some 
consumers with lower prices and the ability to purchase where none existed before.      
 Therefore, even if the reduced search costs of the Internet would consequently 
lead to lower prices, other factors impede this reduction.  Product heterogeneity, 
convenience tools, trust in brands, consumer lock-ins, and price discrimination all may 
contribute to price dispersion on the Internet, unrelated to search costs. 
D. Summary of Economic Analysis 
 The economic analysis of metasites yields surprising observations.  First, it is 
often in the sellers’ interests to initially limit shopbot extraction of their pricing and 
product information, and sellers will presumably take steps to effect this preference.  
Second, economic modeling demonstrates that shopbot use will not inevitably lead to 
lower prices and economic efficiency, but rather will likely induce price wars 
characterized by uncontrolled and damaging robot use.  Finally, in addition to search 
costs, other factors contribute directly to price dispersion, negating any reduction in price 
by diminished search costs.  
 Because comprehensive shopbot access would overly tax a system without 
reducing prices, and potentially redistribute income in a seller- and consumer-detrimental 
manner, a combination of legal and technical mechanisms that will safeguard the Internet 
markets in the transition to metasite use is warranted.  The economic modeling of 
metasites reveals that the pacing of price resetting is a crucial issue directly related to 
robot proliferation.  Given established sellers’ reluctance to participate in price indexing, 
if they were able to invoke and rely upon legal and technical mechanisms to prohibit 
                                                 
99 See Wiseman, supra note 82, at *23. 
100  A study of Books.com found that the average savings to a consumer who used the price comparison 
mechanism was $.15 and that the procedure could take up to 1 minute.  Thus, in essence, Books.com 
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robot use on their websites, this would curtail the potential threat of system overload 
while permitting metasite functioning. 101  With the advancements of metasites to compare 
elements in addition to price, the other factors producing price dispersion will fade, 
assuming they are in fact specious, thus leading to lowered search costs, without robot 
proliferation. 102  Therefore, as metasites become a staple for consumers, branded retailers 
that had prevented shopbot access will find it in their interest to permit shopbot 
indexing. 103  In this fashion, we realize a complete transition to metasite use, while 
avoiding cyclical and taxing price wars, by establishing a time control mechanism. 104  
While this end could be accomplished by legally requiring online retailers to permit robot 
access and then mandating and enforcing a shopbot protocol105, as demonstrated, seller 
limitation of shopbots, through contract and technical standards, appears to offer the same 
result in an indirect manner.106          
 
III. CONTRACT LAW AND ROBOT EXCLUSION 
 The explosive growth in personal computer and Internet use has ushered in a new 
breed of contracts.  Gone are the handshake deals and ornate signatures of yore, replaced 
by shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements.  The hazy realm of intellectual property rights 
in computer information has motivated data owners to eschew governmental protection 
                                                                                                                                                 
discriminated on the basis of convenience and potential savings.  It apparently found that enough 
consumers would find the process too time-consuming to justify the savings.  See id. at *23. 
101 Presumably metasites would continue to index retailers for which the benefits of price indexing 
outweighed the negative aspects, specifically the less branded retailers. 
102 If these factors did not wane, but continued to cause price dispersion, then a static market would 
continue to exist, with consumers choosing well-branded but more expensive retailers, though the desired 
product is offered for less by other vendors.  This presumably is a preferred state to the cyclical price wars, 
which would occur without this legal mechanism.   
103 When the elements other than search costs that affect pricing disappear, established retailers will find it 
necessary to compete with indexed retailers because consumers will otherwise simply select the lowest 
priced indexed vendor. 
104 Presumably, sellers who have avoided metasite price indexing will switch only when consumers are 
wholeheartedly relying on metasites and the vendors who are listed by the metasites offer products for 
substantially less than non-listed vendors  marginal cost of production.  At this point, vendors will not 
need to engage in price resetting race, as the prices have already been set.  The taxing price wars predicted 
in the economic model are thus avoided by temper the transition to metasite use. 
105 For example, the law could impose criminal or civil liability for one who failed to heed a robot 
exclusion header.  
106 Other remedies that retailer might take to protect profits would have more harmful effects on economic 
functioning.  Sellers might charge user fees for access to the market, thus compensating for lost profits, 
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and embrace security through private agreement.107  Initially, to prevent the pirating of 
software, companies implemented shrinkwrap contracts, or unsigned licensing 
agreements accompanying the sale of computer software, for the purpose of binding the 
purchaser when he or she opened the package.108  Clickwrap agreements soon followed, 
referring to contractual terms present on websites.109  These web-based contracts range 
from chat-room access agreements to software-downloading arrangements and include 
terms ranging from indemnity to forum selection. 110  While some websites induce users 
to express consent by having them click on an “I accept” button, other websites simply 
condition use of the site on an implicit acceptance of displayed contractual terms.111   
 If such clickwrap agreements are valid, a website could theoretically prevent 
robots from indexing the site’s data by displaying a simple notice, which reads: “by 
accessing this website, the user agrees not to employ any robot to copy the content of the 
website.”112  Can it be that simple?  Were all the arguments invoking trespass to chattels 
and the CFAA unnecessarily complicated?  Three elements may stand as obstacles to the 
enforceability of robot restriction contracts: 1) the doctrines of consent, contract of 
adhesion, and unconscionability; 2) copyright preemption; and 3) whether robots may 
assent to contract formation.  Despite these ostensible barriers, both contract case law and 
the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act indicate that robot restriction 
contracts are enforceable.       
                                                                                                                                                 
raise the costs of acquiring the information, or increase product differentiation.  See Wiseman supra  note 
70, at 18; Bakos, supra note 55, at *23. 
107 See James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital 
Intellectual Property , 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2010 (2000). 
108 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996); Katy Hull, The Overlooked Concern 
with the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1391, 1393 (2000).   
109 See Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc. No. C 98-20064, 1998 WL 388389, at *5 (N.D. Cal. April 
16, 1998); Hull, supra  note 108, at 1393. 
110 See Dawn Davidson, Click and Commit: What Terms Are Users Bound to When They Enter Web Sites? , 
26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1171, 1180 (2000).    
111 See Hull, supra  note 108, at 1393.  For example, users of eBay must agree to a seven page contract and 
click on an “I accept” button positioned at the end of the agreement.  See Ebay, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 
1060.  However, Register.com “imposes conditions on the access to and end use of data contained in its 
WHOIS database.  It publishes those terms of use on the home page of its Internet website and conditions 
entry into the database on assent to those terms.”  Register.com 2000 WL 1855145, at *5.   
112 While, this presents the most extreme point of clickwrap enforcement, recent case law supports its 
validity.  Nonetheless, a more likely scenario is for websites to rely on a robot exclusion header to bind 
robots to the terms of website use.  By relying on the Robot Exclusion Standard, websites essentially force 
robots to face the terms of the contract before accessing the content of the website.  See supra note 122.      
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A. Shinkwrap and Clickwrap Caselaw 
 While for years, shrinkwrap licenses were of questionable legality, ProCD v. 
Zeidenberg marked a dramatic shift in the courts’ thinking about these contracts.  In 
ProCD, the defendant purchased a software compilation of telephone numbers, extracted 
the records from the database and incorporated them into his own computer program, 
thereby breaching the shrinkwrap agreement.113  Judge Easterbrook, writing for the 7th 
Circuit, declared that manufacturers might enter into private contracts limiting the use of 
their products.114   
 Many argue that shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements constitute unenforceable 
contracts of adhesion, where the offeree is frequently unaware he or she is entering into a 
contract.115  The court in ProCD disregarded contract of adhesion and lack of consent 
arguments, noting that the offeror, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by 
conduct.116  Furthermore, the offeror may dictate the category of action or conduct that 
constitutes an acceptance.117  Here, ProCD offered a contract that the consumer could 
choose to accept by using the software.  Furthermore, Judge Easterbrook noted in a prior 
case that a contract “need not be read to be effective; people who accept take the risk that 
the unread terms may in retrospect prove unwelcome.”118  The court pushed contextual 
unconscionabiltiy concerns aside by stressing that “shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable 
                                                 
113 See 86 F.3d at 1449-50. 
114 Id. at 1455. 
115  See Davidson, supra  note 110, at 1194-1201; Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 
JURIMETRICS J. 311, 317-18 (1995); J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated 
Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information 875, 
911 (1999).   The humorist Dave Barry satirized the length and complexity of shrinkwrap and clickwrap 
agreements, commenting: 
 By Breaking this seal, the user hereinafter agrees to abide by all the terms and conditions  
of the following agreement that nobody ever reads, as well as the Geneva Convention  
and the U.N. Charter and the Secret Membership Oath of the Benevolent Protective  
Order of the Elks, and such other terms and conditions, real and imaginary, as the  
Software Company shall deem necessary and appropriate, including the right to come to 
the user’s home and examine the user’s hard drive, as well as the user’s underwear drawer  
if we feel like it, take it or leave it, until death do us part, one nation indivisible, by dawn’s  
early light, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, finders keepers, losers 
weepers, thanks you’ve been a great crowd, and don’t forget to tip your servers. 
Garry L. Founds, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Note 2B?, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 100 
(1999) (quoting DAVE BARRY, DAVE BARRY IN CYBERSPACE 98 (1996). 
116 See ProCD 86 F.3d at 1452. 
117 See id. at 1452. 
118 Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general.”119  
Clickwrap agreements have received similar, but limited, judicial treatment.  In Hotmail 
Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., the court found that Hotmail was likely to succeed on its 
breach of contract claim when the defendant failed to abide by Hotmail’s online service 
agreement.120  Furthermore, in Caspi v. Microsoft Network , the court affirmed the validity 
of a forum selection clause within an online agreement.121  Finally, the court in 
Register.com enforced a clickwrap agreement where use of the plaintiff’s website was 
conditioned upon assenting to terms posted on the site, requiring no affirmative 
manifestation of assent.122   
Similar to the contract in ProCD, a robot restriction agreement would protect the 
unauthorized use of factual data, namely prices.  Furthermore, a website could implement 
a consent scheme similar to that validated in Register.com, where use of website was 
conditioned upon consenting to terms of the contract.  Despite Register.com’s holding, 
the automatic nature of data robots suggests a more prudent approach would be to 
incorporate the Robot Exclusion Standard within the clickwrap template.  Under this 
scheme, a data robot would be forced to confront and process robot restriction terms. 
Therefore, given the direct parallels between robot restriction contracts and the 
shrinkwrap agreement in ProCD, and the supplemental weight of the clickwrap caselaw, 
robot restriction contracts appear enforceable under contemporary contract law. 
Copyright preemption presents another potential obstacle to the enforcement of 
robot restriction contracts through state contract law.  Copyright law attempts to maintain 
a balance between the creators’ and users’ interests by protecting works of authorship, 
but leaving elements such as ideas, facts and procedures within the public domain. 123  
The question thus arises whether this balance is subject to variation by contract or 
whether the balance embodies unwavering federal policy positions.  In other words, may 
                                                 
119 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1448. 
120 See Hotmail 1998 WL 388389, at *5.  
121 See Caspi v. Microsoft Network, 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
122 See Register.com, 2000 WL 1855145, at *7.  While Verio argued that the contract was unenforceable 
because Verio was not asked to click on an icon indicating it accepted the terms, the court found that the 
presence of clearly posted contractual terms was sufficient.  See id. at *7. 
123 See Founds, supra note 115, at 103-06; Dennis S. Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-
line Licenses, 22 DAYTON L. REV. 511, 514-21.   
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private parties create intellectual property rights through contract where no right existed 
before?  In the context of robot restriction agreements, the issue becomes whether the 
factual pricing information, which is planted in the public domain by copyright law, may 
be rendered proprietary through contract. 
In ProCD, the district court found that it would alter the delicate balance of 
copyright law to allow parties to contract around it.124  Judge Easterbrook reversed, 
however, finding that the contract rights were not “equivalent to any of the exclusive 
rights within the general scope of copyright.”125  The court reasoned that while copyright 
law provides a right against the world, contract rights affect only the parties to the 
contract and that “strangers may do as they please.”126  The court further illustrated this 
distinction by emphasizing that if somebody found a copy of ProCD’s database on the 
sidewalk, the licensing agreement would not limit the finder.127  Therefore, Judge 
Easterbrook concluded that, “whether a particular license is generous or restrictive, a 
simple two-party contract is not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the 
general scope of copyright and therefore may be enforced.”128  For similar reasons, 
copyright law would presumably not preempt a robot restriction agreement under 
contract law. 
Whether robots may enter into contracts and bind a third party, i.e., the robot’s 
implementer, presents a final obstacle to the enforceability of robot restriction 
agreements.  Some have turned to agency law principles to address this concern. 129 
Agency describes a relationship between two parties where an agent party consents to act 
                                                 
124 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 655 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
125 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1454.  
126 Id. at 1454.  
127 Id. at 1454. 
128 Id. at 1455.  But Judge Easterbrook’s stance on copyright preemption has generated significant 
controversy.  For example, Dennis Karjala draws a distinction between widely accessible and generally 
inaccessible works.  For widely accessible works, Professor Karjala argues that the copyright scheme does 
not merely serve as a default position that may be reordered through private contract.  Rather, “to allow 
private reordering of these rights by agreement between the copyright owner and the direct users . . . would 
be to ignore the interest of the general public that the copyright balances have been so carefully designed to 
protect.  Karjala, supra  note 123, at 518-19.  Furthermore, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion has been criticized 
for failing to address whether the enforcement of state contract law may be preempted by the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution as opposed to Section 301 of the Copyright Act, which he focuses on.  See id. at 
522. 
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on behalf of and under control of the principal party. 130  When an agent acts according to 
his or her authority, the agent has the power to affect the legal status of the principal to 
the same extent as if the principal had acted.131  As a result, when an agent enters into a 
contract with a third party, that third party may subsequently enforce the contract against 
the principal. 132  Therefore, under agency law, it appears that a robot that enters into a 
clickwrap agreement, either by clicking on an “I accept button,” or disregarding the 
express protocol set forth in a robot exclusion header, binds the person who designed and 
implemented the robot.133     
 Therefore, the doctrines of assent and contract of adhesion, copyright preemption, 
and robot contracting fail to present concrete obstacles to the enforceability of robot 
restriction agreements under current contract common law.   
B. UCITA and Robot Restriction Agreements 
  Spurred by the need for uniformity within the realm of non-tangible information 
contracting, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(“NCCUSL”) composed and disseminated the Uniform Computer Information 
Transaction Act (“UCITA”).134  UCITA, a model contract law to be adopted by 
individual states, governs agreements that involve “computer information 
transactions,”135 and has garnered significant support,136 but also engendered strident 
opposition. 137  Computer information refers to “information in electronic form which is 
                                                                                                                                                 
129 See Middlebrook & Muller, supra  note 3, at passim. 
130 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). 
131 See id. at § 12; Middlebrook & Muller, supra  note 3, at 356.    
132 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY at § 140; Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 3, at 356.    
133 Furthermore, the recently enacted federal E-SIGN statute states that “a contract . . . may not be denied 
legal effect, validity or enforceability solely because its formation, creation or delivery involved the action 
of one or more electronic agents so long as the action of any such electronic agent is legally attributable to 
the person to be bound.” 15 U.S.C. 7001(h).  While E-SIGN does not expressly validate contracts formed 
by robots, it appears to yield to their enforceability.     
134 See Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Uniform Rules for Internet Information Transactions: An Overview of 
Proposed UCITA¸ 38 DUQ. L. REV. 319, 321-23 (2000). 
135 See UNIFORM COMPUTER INFORMATION TRANSACTIONS ACT (2000) [hereinafter UCITA]. 
136 See, e.g., generally Mary Jo Howard Dively, A Survey of the Electronic Contracting Rules in the 
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 38 DUQ. L. 
REV., 209 (2000); Garry L. Founds, supra note 115.  
137 See, e.g., generally Hull, supra note 108; Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of 
Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements 45 UCLA L. REV. 569 (1997).    
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obtained from or through the use of a computer . . .”138  UCITA’s coverage includes 
contracts to license software, create computer information, distribute computer 
information, and gain access to online databases.139  The concept of a robot restriction 
contract appears to fall squarely within UCITA’s definition of a viable access agreement 
as “a contract to obtain by electronic means access to, or information from, an 
information processing system of another person, or the equivalent of such access.”140  
Furthermore, UCITA expressly addresses the three concerns present at common law: 1) 
the doctrines of consent and contract of adhesion, 2) copyright preemption, and 3) robot 
assent. 
  UCITA offers liberal rules of contract formation, providing that a contract may be 
effected by any method sufficient to show agreement, including offer and acceptance or 
conduct by the parties.141  “An offer to make a contract invites acceptance in any manner 
and by any medium reasonable under the circumstances.”142  The question then becomes 
what constitutes a reasonable acceptance of robot restriction terms.  While the affirmative 
clicking on an “I agree” button would presumably satisfy this provision of UCITA, it is 
questionable whether the conditioning of website use on assent to posted terms would 
prove reasonable under the circumstances.  Rather, the use of a robot exclusion header, in 
combination with posted terms would prove more efficient and reliable.  Use of the 
Robot Exclusion Standard would compel robots to confront contractual terms without 
beleaguering legitimate website users with burdensome consent provisions.   
  UCITA explicitly asserts that federal preemption applies.143  As with all state 
laws, those provisions of UCITA that are preempted by federal law become invalid to the 
degree of the preemption. 144  Nonetheless, UCITA renders shrinkwrap and clickwrap 
                                                 
138 UCITA § 102. 
139 See Pratik A. Shah, Berkeley Law Journal Annual Review of Law and Technology: The Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 85, 89 (2000). 
140 UCITA § 102. 
141 UCITA § 202; see also Founds, supra note 115, at 102.  While UCITA contains a special provision 
governing mass-market licenses, robot restrictions would not constitute such agreements under § 209.  And 
even if one could argue that robot restriction agreements represent mass-market licenses, the extra 
safeguards provided would prove inconsequential in this context. 
142 UCITA § 203. 
143 UCITA § 105(a). 
144 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1177 (6th ed. 1990) 
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agreements generally enforceable, despite the inherent nature of information licensing to 
implicate values embodied in federal copyright law. 145  The primary goal of clickwrap 
and shrinkwrap agreements is to limit the copying and use of proprietary material.146  
Therefore, while UCITA claims to be neutral in the debate over whether copyright law 
should preempt private information contracts,147 it in fact noticeably slants toward Judge 
Easterbrook’s view in ProCD.  Raymond Nimmer, the reporter for UCITA, claims that 
copyright law functions as a default standard, which may be contracted around by 
consenting parties.  Therefore, if UCITA’s implicit endorsement of clickwrap agreements 
that implicate copyright privileges becomes established, robot restriction agreements 
would not be stymied by federal preemption under UCITA. 
  Finally, UCITA strengthens the position of the ability of data robots to form 
contracts.  UCITA confirms that robots or electronic agents may enter into contracts with 
other electronic agents or individuals,148 and furthermore contains an attribution rule, 
which states that an electronic authentication is attributed to the person who implemented 
the electronic agent.149  “A person that uses an electronic agent that [he or she] has 
selected for making an authentication, performance, or agreement, including 
manifestation of assent, is bound by the operations of the electronic agent, even if no 
individual was aware of or reviewed the agent’s operations or the results of the 
operations.”150  Therefore, if a pricebot validly forms a contract pursuant to UCITA, its 
implementer is bound by the contract’s terms.   
  An electronic agent manifests assent if it authenticates a contract or engages in 
operations or conduct that indicate acceptance of the contractual terms.151  Additionally, 
                                                 
145 See supra ; UCITA § 209.  As illustrated, UCITA establishes a template for mass-market contracts 
involving computer.  This in essence is the definition of a shrinkwrap or clickwrap agreement.   
146 See Shah, supra, note 139, at 97.   Shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements developed to protect the 
unlicensed copying and distribution of software, as well as a mechanism to circumvent the first sale 
doctrine have traditionally involved intellectual property rights.  As the Internet gains popularity as a retail 
medium, clickwrap agreements have progressed to include non-intellectual property aspects, such as a user 
agreement dictating appropriate conduct in a chat-room.  See Hull, supra note 108, at 1393-94.  
Nevertheless, UCITA’s mass-market licensing scheme was designed with the traditional shrinkwrap and 
clickwrap contracts in mind.  See Founds, supra  note 115, at 103.   
147 See Ring, supra  note 134, at 326. 
148 UCITA § 206. 
149 UCITA § 213; see also Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 3, at 352. 
150 UCITA § 107. 
151 UCITA § 112. 
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proof that a robot obtained or used information where the robot must have engaged in 
specific conduct to access the information, verifies assent to a contract that limits access 
to the information. 152  Moreover, a website provides an electronic agent with the 
opportunity to review a contract if it makes it available in a manner that a reasonably 
configured electronic agent would react to.153  Therefore, placing the contractual terms of 
a robot restriction agreement within the robot exclusion header would notify a reasonably 
configured robot of the website’s policy. 154  Consequently, UCITA’s strong robot 
attribution rules and its robot assent provisions appear to sanction pricebot restriction 
agreements when implemented through a robot exclusion header. 
  Therefore, UCITA essentially sanctions the use of robot restriction agreements.  It 
provides liberal contract formation policies, implicitly approves of private contracting 
around federal copyright law, and offers liberal robot assent specifications.  A properly 
formulated robot restriction agreement, designed to prevent shopbots from gathering 
pricing information, thus appears to fall squarely within the realm of UCITA. 
C. Summary and Conclusion of Current Law Regarding Robot Exclusion Contracts 
  Dicta in Ebay and Register.com suggest that web-based contracts, which users 
would encounter upon entering a website, would prove effective in preventing price data 
collection by shopbots.155  While elements of clickwrap agreements have sparked 
controversy surrounding these contracts’ enforceability, contract common law and the 
momentum gained by UCITA promote the enforceability of properly couched robot 
restriction contracts.  Practically, a robot restriction agreement could either compel 
consumers to click on an “I accept” button or incorporate its terms through the code of a 
robot exclusion header.  By relying on the Robot Exclusion Standard, a website offers a 
legally viable shopbot restriction agreement without burdening legitimate human web 
users with unavoidable clickwrap language   
 
IV. INTEGRATION OF PUBLIC POLICY, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, AND 
CONTRACT LAW: THE NEED FOR A FAIR USE STANDARD 
                                                 
152 UCITA § 112(d). 
153 UCITA § 112(d); see also Middlebrook & Muller, supra note 3, at 352.  
154 See supra Part I (describing robot exclusion headers and text files).  
155  See Ebay 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1060; Register.com, 2000 WL 1855145, at *5-8. 
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  The combination of computing technologies and the Internet has revolutionized 
the production and dissemination of information, while obscuring the border between the 
public and private domains.  The improvements in the calculation and compilation 
processes of factual information, and the drastic lowering of search costs, have facilitated 
access to all information. 156  Intellectual property law has traditionally recognized a dual 
function of information: on the one hand information should exist as a proprietary entity 
under the control of the creator, and on the other hand, information should function as an 
unprotected element to promote knowledge exploration and growth. 157  While federal 
intellectual property law establishes a balance between these two ends of the spectrum, 
the question arises whether the use of contract law as a proxy for intellectual property law 
disregards the public use aspect of information.  In the context of robot restriction 
agreements, the question becomes whether denying robots access to pricing and product 
information frustrates valuable public use.  
  Contract common law and UCITA both support the enforceability of robot 
restriction agreements.  This contracting regime thus places pricing and product 
information at the extreme proprietary end of the dual information spectrum; these legal 
systems permit uncomplicated formation of contracts that grant wide-ranging control of 
factual information and restrict even potentially beneficial public use of the data.  The 
question then arises whether any beneficial use of product and pricing information 
outweighs the need to afford proprietary rights to the records.  Economic analysis has 
revealed: 1) that unencumbered metasite activity leads to price wars, which may well 
result in mass system strain or price premiums; and 2) even if reduced search costs 
necessarily lead to lower prices, factors unrelated to search costs will maintain price 
dispersion.  Therefore, economic analysis provides an incentive to lean in favor of 
proprietary interests over the public use of pricing and product data. 
  Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine beneficial uses of pricing and product 
data.  First, while pricing data itself may prove of little use in the progress of education, 
science and research, data robots and metasites are far from limited to pricing 
                                                 
156 See Reichman & Franklin, supra  note 115, at 884. 
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information.  Rather, data robots can potentially collect and compile information 
regarding any subject matter, including addresses and contact information, research 
results, and event and transportation scheduling.  Furthermore, metasites continue to offer 
consumers increasingly more information in addition to price, such as warranty 
provisions, shipping processes, and consumer satisfaction.  Thus, the ease of formation of 
robot restriction agreements may limit valid and worthwhile public access to an unlimited 
range of data.  For example, research on factors unrelated to search costs, which maintain 
price dispersion, may promote the elimination of these factors (if they are in fact false), 
thereby allowing lower-search costs to lead to marginal cost of production pricing 
through controlled shopbot implementation.  
  Second, the detrimental first prong of the economic analysis was predicated upon 
shopbots and metasites acting as profit-seeking enterprises.  Under this model, metasites 
had incentives to satisfy as many queries as rapidly as possible, thus furthering 
disadvantageous price wars.  However, a public interest, non-profit metasite might 
sidestep this obstacle by limiting its queries, thereby removing an essential link in the 
perpetration of retailer price-query/price-resetting functions.158  Furthermore, if such a 
non-profit, public interest metasite existed, it might provide improved opportunities for 
the price-affecting factors unrelated to search costs to wane.  Therefore, concrete public-
use interests exist for product and pricing information.     
  How then should contract law permit acceptable public use of pricing and product 
information, while permitting retailers to control access to pricing data and thereby 
preserve the integrity of online markets?  A potential solution would be the development 
of a technical standard modeled after the principles of the fair use defense to federal 
copyright infringement.  The fair use defense permits courts to avoid rigid application of 
the law when it would unfairly restrict dissemination of useful works to the public.159  
Section 107 of the Copyright Act lists four factors to consider when deciding whether a 
                                                                                                                                                 
157 See id. at 884-85. 
158 If for example a metasite updated its prices only once an hour or once a day, this would eliminate the 
possibility of retailers relying on metasites to check other retailer’s prices and adjust their own prices 
accordingly.   
Enforceability of robot restriction agreements, which rely upon the Robot Exclusion Standard 
would, as discussed, also result in a limitation of shopbot queries, thereby accomplishing the same result  
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public use is justified: 1) the purpose and character of the use, 2) the nature of the 
protected work, 3) the effect of the use upon the potential markets for the work, and 4) 
the amount of the work used.160  A viable fair-use standard of robot accommodation 
could directly parallel the federal copyright provisions and include a condition limiting 
the frequency of robot use.  This technical standard could be incorporated within the 
robot exclusion header, which would already be used to couch the robot restrictive 
contractual terms.       
  Therefore, if one were to contemplate a non-profit metasite, which performed 
only a limited number of inquiries (as opposed to a commercial metasite that had an 
economic incentive to maximize its inquiries), such a use would satisfy a technical 
standard that focused on the character of the information collected and the process used 
to collect it.  The purpose and character of the use reflect strong economic policy.  The 
nature of the work, i.e., factual pricing data, engenders less sympathy if taken than other 
forms of protected work, because the substance of prices is inherently intended to be 
disseminated to consumers.  Furthermore, the technical standard could indicate the 
maximum frequency of robot queries that the fair use standard will tolerate.161  Therefore, 
a technical standard accommodating fair use shopbot operation would prove viable and 
beneficial in restoring the balance of the dual nature of information, while preserving the 
economic and proprietary incentives.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
  While the Internet offers the potential to radically transform economic markets 
and consumerism, we must not be rash in assuming that by its nature it will inherently 
accomplish this goal.  Rather, the law should recognize that the reduced search costs of 
the Internet create as many dangers as they offer remedies.  While reduced search costs 
are inherently beneficial, to superimpose them upon a market and technological structure 
unprepared to accommodate them, while ignoring the potentially adverse consequences, 
                                                                                                                                                 
159 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
160 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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could be as harmful as inhibiting the reduction in search costs in general.  The uncertain 
direction of Internet markets encourages a more balanced acquiescence to pricebots and 
metasites.  Enforceability of robot restriction contracts and the addition of a fair use 
technical standard offers a stable and evenhanded approach to encouraging economic 
efficiency and avoiding the dangers of reckless reliance on the Internet.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
161 The hypothetical non-profit metasite, because it moderates its robot use, could satisfy the robot 
frequency element within the technical standard.  Contrarily, a commercial metasite will have economic 
incentives that urge it to deploy robots as frequently as possible. 
